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1 For  decades  the  supporters  of
secularization and religious  revival  have
conducted  heated  debates  in  support  of
the  one  or  other  thesis  (or  rather,
hypothesis);  each  with  increasingly
fervent invective, each bent on defending
an  aprioristic  point  of  view  rather  than
collecting and comparing empirical data.
Even in  the face  of  significant  empirical
evidence,  some  uncertainties  remain
regarding  the  representativeness  of  the
samples  used,  the  possibility  of
generalizing the results and the duration
of the trends emerging.
2 Meanwhile,  one unequivocal  fact  must  be taken into account:  religions continue to
resist various secularizing thrusts and persevere at global level, influencing, more or
less openly, both the attitude and the behaviour of billions of people.
3 Moreover, sociologists themselves, although deontologically committed to maintaining
a scientifically neutral stance, are not immune from some kind of confessional leaning,
that  shows  through  value  judgments,  operational  suggestions,  through  dictates  on
what ‘ought to be’ and a-critical devaluation of the points of view of others, contested
only because they do not converge with their own. 
4 At  times,  the  defence  of  a  particular  vision  of  reality  is  effectively  shrouded  in
theoretical rigour and methodological thoroughness, but, in the long run, prejudicial
positions can be detected in turns of phrase, allusions, the use of adjectives, reticence,
and fundamental options.
5 When talking about  values,  social  scientists,  however scrupulous,  cannot  hide their
own orientations which emerge in their language choices, the authors quoted, the geo-
political and territorial references made, the argumentative modes adopted.
6 However, the main flaw is to be found in the empirical grounds upon which theses
supporting a particular Weltanschauung are built. Truly reliable research studies are, in
fact, few and far between, especially at comparative level, because too many procedural
problems  deriving  from  exceedingly  diverging  contexts  influence  the  results  of
scientific research. All told, only a profound knowledge of rationales and historical and
cultural  dynamics  can  –  if  at  all  –  justify  heterogeneous  results,  broadly  diverging
percentages, somewhat flexible correlations, correspondences between variables that
are not easy to read. 
7 Yet, by forcing statistics and similarities between different frameworks, one may end
up by providing an all-inclusive interpretation of  rather complex realities,  weak in
methodological acumen and devoid of the necessary adaptation of certain aspects of a
social-historical-anthropological  nature.  This  explains  why  some  descriptions,  the
intrinsic value of which lies more in the rhetoric of appealing expressions (such as “the
eclipse of the sacred”; “invisible religion”; “silent revolution”; “secular age”; and so on)
than in the soundness of empirical data and in the efficacy of a scientific approach
related  to  the  phenomenon  being  examined,  attain  widespread  credibility  at
international level. 
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8 Hans  Joas’s  position  in  this  sense  appears  rather  problematic,  because, while  his
affirmations, in the broad sense, may be agreed with, they contain contradictions and
marginal notes that make it difficult to agree totally with them. 
9 In various parts of Joas’s discourse there are clear evaluative cues,  accompanied by
explicit assumption of stance, although later denied in the same passage.
10 In conclusion, the collocation of the author is clearly definable, at times self-consistent,
with  some  suggestions  of  a  prejudicial  culture,  despite  some  possibilistic  openings
concerning the definition of sociological situations and profiles on the whole.
11 Absolutism and dogmatism do not belong to the German scholar’s usual vocabulary or
even to his implicit language, although some of the positions, emerging here and there
in his approach while probably masked, are always evident to the attentive reader.
12 On the other hand, his reference to sacrality, to transcendence, to the perception of
values  (and  therefore  to  religion)  does  not  pass  unnoticed.  Consequences  and
interpretations may be drawn from this reference, which, indisputably, deny both the
decline of religion and religious awakening, and tend to confute correlations between
the process of modernization and the progress of secularization, confining the latter to
a simple “contingency”, localized essentially in Europe.
13 In  reality,  Joas  tends  to  refuse  similarities  between  religion  and  self-suggestion
therapy, and points, instead, to the historical novelty of secularization, that appears
initially in the 1950’s in Eastern Europe, in the 1970’s in Western Europe.
14 He avails of all this to confute the idea that moral decline is due to secularization: even
the most secularized European societies are not influenced – in his view – by processes
of  modernization,  and therefore  can maintain  their  own moral  profile,  despite  the
pressures of  secularization.  Indeed,  to confirm this position Joas quotes the case of
Banfield’s amoral familism in southern Italy, in order to maintain that even the most
religiously oriented of societies may be inclined towards corruption or analogous forms
of amorality.
15 In reality, this kind of reference fails to mention the vexata quaestio which for decades
has led to strong critiques of the true nature of the absence of morality in southern
Italy. The fact is that amoral familism, precisely because it has been contested so much
from  so  many  points  of  view,  is  not  sufficiently  emblematic  to  corroborate  the
particularly  relevant  statement  of  the  role  of  religion  in  relation  to  non-virtuous
behaviour. In other words, Banfield’s example does not suit discussion of a broader
kind (a small town in Lucania can hardly be considered an adequate instance suitable
for historical and international comparison).
16 All  told,  the  fact  that  secularization  does  not  necessarily  imply  moral  decline  is
reasonable enough, but the empirical evidence produced does not add much to what is
already known; instead, it  seems to be counterproductive, being, as it  is,  associated
with research, generally considered unreliable on account of its methodology and the
degree of comprehension of the reality examined (also from a linguistic point of view).
Above all,  the  theoretical  conclusions  of  the  study have led to  prejudice,  a  bias  so
explicit  that  is  now considered almost  a  classic  tópos  in  the field  of  social  sciences
applied to the Italian context.
17 It is possible to agree with Joas, on the contrary, when he sustains the exiguity of the
connection between the phenomenon of secularization and the decline of morality. The
same can be said for the relationship between modernization and trends in ethical
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propensities. In fact the frequently contradictory results that emerge from empirical
data lead to corroboration of the hypothesis of the absence of a direct relationship
between processes of modernization and a crisis of morals.
18 The four secularization and morality levels proposed by Joas deserve even greater in-
depth analysis: first, whether the resilience of morality is due to its own long historical
tradition;  secondly whether the so-called tribal  societies too base their  morality on
religion;  thirdly,  whether  interaction  between  new religious  modes  and  traditional
morality exists; and finally, whether moral rules have a double origin. The aim is that
of identifying the dangers (and risks) represented by the event of a moral regression. In
short, as can be seen here too, the approach tends to focus more on the consequences
of secularization than, perhaps, on the need to fully understand the reality underlying
the analysis. 
19 The  first  issue:  the  author  makes  a  distinction  mainly  between  Catholics  and
Protestants, affirming that where the former would be more inclined to see the world
as separated from God, the latter, would see God as pretty well present in real life. In
short, Catholics would claim that every human relation is established with the divinity
itself,  while  Protestants  would  assign  an  exclusively human  value  to  the  issue.  In
education processes the differences would be evident: the Protestants would learn a
spirit  of  enterprise,  integrity  and  initiative,  while  loyalty,  obedience  and  patience
would be the values transmitted to the Catholics. 
20 Joas shuns excessively simplified schemata and recurs to suggestions found in Ronald
Inglehart’s international empirical studies, now rather out-dated (going back to over
thirty years ago) and, moreover, not always reliable from a methodological point of
view,  especially  as  far  as  the  sampling  used  in  the  various  countries  examined  is
concerned.  Above  all,  Inglehart’s  studies  lack  empirical  evidence  relating  to  the
presumed connections between the different denominations that are more influential
outside than inside the USA. The differences also regard the young and should not
therefore  be  linked to  age  classes  but  to  cultural  factors  peculiar  to  Great  Britain,
Ireland, Canada and Australia, which yield results contrary to those for the USA. 
21 Therefore,  the  religious  imagination  appears  to  exercise  continual  influence  even
where it is quite distant from religious tradition. This position might be acceptable and
shareable (it is no chance that it is quite similar to my theoretical proposal of diffused
religion as a result of territorial and cultural confessional dominance). But Joas goes as
far as to say that all secular visions retain residual traces of the religious imagination.
My opinion differs from Joas’s on this extension of religious content to all forms of
secularization. Undoubtedly there are elements of the Lutheran Protestant culture in
Swedish politics, and of the Orthodox culture in Stalinist Soviet politics, but it is not
plausible  to  put  a  religious  label  on  all  cases,  including  atheism.  In  other  words,
secularization may have religious roots, but this is not necessarily true at all times and
in all cases.
22 It must also be pointed out that in many instances Joas appears to be judgemental. On
the one hand, he defines as ridiculous some opinions that do not coincide with his own,
which, by the way, are not always empirically sustained. On the other hand, it must be
acknowledged that the German sociologist does refuse some summary evaluations on
the disinformation of religiously oriented individuals and on the immorality of atheists.
23 He rightly observes that those evaluations do have a moral content, but he adds that
they contain ideological distortions and do not appear serious. Thus, considerations
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based  on  value  judgments  and  unverified  sociological  statements  re-emerge,
unsupported by adequate bibliographical references.
24 As regards the second issue, Joas does not insist on the pervasiveness of religion, and
thinks that tribal solidarity originates from a moral source independent of religious
afflatus, based on a (Durkheimian) feeling of collectivity and on a (Malinowskian) spirit
of cooperation, and reciprocity in the generous (Maussian) exchange of gifts.
25 It  is  precisely the topic of  reciprocity which re-emerges when addressing the third
issue: morality, that orients the behaviour of mutual assistance, strives to assert itself
and  therefore  requires  a  religious  support.  Once  more  the  centrality  of  religion
emerges, but Joas maintains, rightly, that religious motivations are not sufficient, and
that the thrust towards non-violence and towards respect of human dignity may also
characterise non-religious subjects, as in the case of the story told by Lescow of the
missionary who was not helped by a baptized person but by a non-believer.
26 To  conclude,  the  German  sociologist  holds  that  it  is  not  secularization  that  has  a
negative  influence  on  the  survival  of  moral  rules,  because  these  may  be  observed
simply as a  result  of  rational  calculation or due to commitment to the values they
represent, or both. This might be the double origin of moral norms. But Joas claims that
the origin can be traced back to explicitly value-based experiences, and to reflections
regarding conditions vital to cooperation. In short, he identifies the origin in specific
values  or  in  values  derived  from  cooperative  exigency.  Here  the  convergences  are
broader: goodness does not descend from religious perspectives alone.
27 But a trend that seems to be deontological and partly ideological appears;  in fact –
apart from some explicit militant choices on the author’s part – a strong wish to avoid
confusion between faith  and values,  and,  consequently,  a  reluctance  to  impose  the
former, and a willingness to share the latter, also emerge. 
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